The 2nd Annual Conference on the Philosophy of Consciousness of the UA Centre for Philosophical Psychology, on The Contents of Consciousness, took place on 26 October 2002, at Hof van Liere, city campus, University of Antwerp.

Introduction

This conference will address the nature of intentionality. Intentionality is the feature of mental states by which they are 'directed at' or 'about' contents or objects and states of affairs in the world. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano took this feature as the 'mark of the mental', that is, the criterion that separates mental properties or phenomena from those that are not mental. In recent years, many philosophers have put a very high priority on providing a 'naturalistic' account of intentionality. It is the project of giving an account of the role of the intentional in the physical world. Contemporary theories of intentionality have mostly concentrated on high-level mental states such as believes and desires, which can be analysed without paying attention to consciousness. However, intentionality is also a feature of at least some conscious or phenomenal states, such as visual and auditory experiences. These more elementary kinds of intentionality will also be addressed.

Presentations

Peter Reynaert (University of Antwerp)
A Nonpresentationalist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness

Jean Petitot (CREA, Paris)
Naturalized Phenomenology and Brain Computing

Arno Ros (University of Magdeburg)
Intentionality as a Mark of the Mental - Remarks on the Logic of Mental Concepts

William Lyons (Trinity College, Dublin)
Consciousness and Intentionality